Will Iran go nuclear now that Trump is in power – or can a deal be done?

Iran’s nuclear activity began in the 1950s by chance with the help of the United States and within the framework of the “Atoms for Peace” programme the United States currently wants to end. In 1967, Tehran installed a 5-megawatt research reactor at the University of Tehran and received 93% of the enriched uranium fuel from the United States.

In the 1970s, he relied on European countries to further develop its nuclear programme and signed a contract with West German company Siemens to build the Buscher Nuclear Power Plant, a project completed by Russia after the 1979 revolution. With disclosures of Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002, the West increased the severity of sanctions and pressure on Iran.

The nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in July 2015, but Trump retreated in May 2018, and Iran gradually reduced its “nuclear commitment” and approached the acquisition of an atomic bomb.

Tehran says its nuclear activity is “peace” and the production and use of weapons of mass destruction is abominable in Islam. However, what is prohibited by Shia religious scholars can be permitted tomorrow by fatwa issued by Shia religious authority and leaders.

Iran and the nuclear bomb: three scenarios

The first most likely scenario: Iran is on the verge of building a bomb, but has not decided to build it. Tehran is currently enriching uranium to 60%, potentially reaching the 90% required for nuclear weapons.

Iranian officials argue that their strategy is to create leverage of pressure in negotiations and deterrence without crossing the red line. However, the Western intelligence agency says Iran is on the brink of becoming a core.

If Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, within “a few days” you can obtain the enriched uranium needed to produce an atomic bomb. Iran also has no challenges to build warheads and launch platforms. This is because ballistic missiles such as Khorramshahr and Sejjil can already carry warheads.

Most unlikely scenario: Iran is building a bomb, and the hidden option is the last bullet in Tehran barrels. There is no conclusive evidence of this claim from the intelligence agency, and the Tehranian regime may believe that in this case, a worse situation awaits them than North Korea is waiting for them, and that their regime is likely to be dismantled, as Iranians don’t want to be like North Korean citizens.

Iran under sanctions

The Islamic Republic and Iranians have lived under sanctions for 46 years. From expanding ties with China and Russia to finding ways to sell licensed oil and finding customers, Tehran has always found ways to survive by turning on the so-called strategic patience and collapse.

But now, Iran is in a difficult situation due to high inflation, real, public dissatisfaction and crippling sanctions. There was the same pressure that forced Tehran to accept the JCPOA in 2015, but this time it gets bigger. t

Ehran struggles to breathe new life into the diseased economy, and knows that in today’s world we cannot live without global interaction.

Israel, which has its own nuclear weapons and is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), committed itself under the initiation doctrine, so that Iran and neighboring states would never allow them to acquire nuclear weapons.

This doctrine was the basis for Israel’s preemptive strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and the 2007 attack on Syria’s nuclear facility.

Iranian Arab neighbours, such as Saudi Arabia, don’t want them either.

Parallel negotiations between Iran and Europe – can it prevent war?

Iran took part in Europe’s largest war since World War II by supplying Shahed drones to Russia. It was a bold decision that had no other goals other than gaining approval from the Russians and support for the international equation to reduce global pressure.

And the prices were heavy: a more intense conflict between the West and the European Union.

Tehran’s justification was that Europeans were always acting against the US and Iran, and had to make difficult choices based on “national interests.”

Trump doesn’t see much of a role for Brussels, but Europeans have been able to play an important and influential role by providing economic incentives to Tehran and mediating their reaching a new nuclear deal. Tensions and instability in the Middle East affect Europe’s security and economy.

However, the European Union was not independently effective in providing effective assurances against reducing US sanctions under the influence of Washington.

If negotiations end with a deadlock and a war and an Israeli attack on Iran, the European Union, in its most optimistic, is content to oppose the options of war, but cannot prevent it.

Middle Eastern Iranian floating boats, proxy

Trump says he’s willing to negotiate with Iran if Tehran “completely abandons” its nuclear program and all shots are now responsible for Iran. Therefore, US dealings with Iran are not just about nuclear and the economy. Iran’s missile capabilities and proxy will be possible agreements with two main axes of negotiations.

The Iranian government may make concessions in the nuclear field and reduce the enrichment of its uranium, for example, but it is doubtful that it will stop providing Hezbollah, Lebanon, with rockets that can be fired at the Houtsis of Israel and Yemen.

However, with or without Ayatollah, Iran’s idealism cannot continue without the mainstay of the economy, oil exports.

Neither pistachio exports nor Iran’s luxury carpets, missiles and drones can fill the vacuum in the oil revenues of the country living in government or subsidized bread and gasoline.

Iran suffers from the curse of resources that rich natural resources such as oil and gas do not enrich the country, but it has yet to move beyond its oil-dependent single-product economy.

The blessing of oil and its heavy dependence on its revenues have become a source of trouble for Iran.

Is Iran the option other than to make a deal with Trump?

yes. In exchange for the dynamic oil economy and carefree life of Arab countries in the Gulf, they forget the “axis of resistance” and their nuclear and missile ambitions. But that’s an option that Tehran doesn’t take into consideration.

When asked why, they point out an example of the fate of Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

The only current options for Iranians are negotiation and negotiation, and they are skilled and used to it.

While the best option is to maintain the status quo and avoid the biggest American pressure, this time it will be difficult for the Iranian government to buy until the end of Trump’s second term.

The Trump-led United States wants a written agreement Trump gave to the government for two months to achieve that.

War options are against Iran’s interests. Trump’s maximum pressure will exacerbate the economic situation and Iran will not win if a war breaks out.

If Iran is targeting US ships and bases or Arab countries, or if Huchis closes the strategic straits of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab, it will also face military responses from the Arabs, and Tehran knows that Russia will not be mindful of the call.

Iran will negotiate again as it did with JCPOA I, but it’s not as easy as it used to be. Tehran accepts the JCPOA in 2015 and hopes for economic openness. However, Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA created a great discomfort for Tehran.

This time, Iran may accept a more limited, phased agreement. It strongly assures that the US will not withdraw again, and will maintain a “peaceful” nuclear program with stricter and broader surveillance.